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A BROADER VIEW                                            
OF THE CATHEDRAL:                                             
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF                                
THE LIABILITY RULE,                     




Recent years have seen a resurgence of Torts viewed as a purely private 
legal arrangement: whether described in terms of compensatory justice—the 
right of an injured party to be made whole1—or of redress for civil wrongs—the 
right of an injured person to get back at the one who injured him.2 These 
positions reject the approach of the system builders (to use Izhak Englard’s 
felicitous phrase),3 those who see torts as part of a legal–political–economic 
structure of a polity. This latter, “public,” view of torts has been dominant, at 
least since my first article,4 and Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven’s answer to it, 
aptly titled Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem.5 It is of the 
relationship between these approaches, and of the inevitability of the public-law 
(and hence, in part, economic) view of torts that I wish to write today. In doing 
so, however, I mainly want to correct an error that many system builders have 
made: that is, of viewing the liability rule (in torts and in its cognates) as a 
“second best” way of mimicking markets when markets “will not work,” or “are 
not available.” I want to claim a more significant economic role for the liability 
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 1.  See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982). 
 2.  See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal 
Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2006).  
 3.  Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980).  
 4.  See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 
499 (1961). 
 5.  See 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964). Blum and Kalven offered a superb intervention that moved 
the discussion forward in fruitful ways. See Guido Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World 
of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Empty Cabinet 
of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1967); cf. Steven G. 
Medema, Juris Prudence: Calabresi’s Uneasy Relationship with the Coase Theorem, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 65, 85 (discussing the interaction between me, Blum and Kalven, and 
Coase). 
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rule, and hence for torts, than that. For reasons that will be clear in due course, 
I call this A Broader View of the Cathedral. 
II 
Interestingly, the new privatists distinguish torts from contract and criminal 
law, by recognizing the public-law role of the latter two (while essentially 
ignoring their private roles) and suggesting that torts instead has primarily a 
private role. As to torts, they seem to say that if a direct Injurer–Victim 
relationship is destroyed, the field would be gone.6 I, instead, will contend that 
although something might be lost, an essential part of torts would remain alive 
and well even without that relationship, as is the case in New Zealand.7 But let 
us first look at the privatists’ strangely limited view of contract and criminal law. 
At least when they are contrasting these fields to torts, the privatists seem to 
talk of contract and criminal law as if they only had a public function. Contracts 
is seen as a market way of regulating the economy—of shifting entitlements and 
deciding what is mine and what is yours—by consent of the parties. Criminal 
and regulatory law is viewed as a collectivist approach to doing the same 
thing—deciding by state command what is mine and what is yours. This way of 
speaking, however, ignores the very important private-law functions of both 
fields. In contracts, and in criminal or regulatory law—as in torts—once a way of 
determining when and how entitlements can be shifted has been established, a 
set of private expectations grow up around the means chosen. And these private 
expectations come to have a value of their own that cannot, at any given 
moment in the law’s time, be ignored without significant harm. 
That is why Justice Holmes’s position that anyone has a right to break a 
contract when performance is more expensive than breach8 has historically been 
called a heresy.9 His position ignored the private role of contract law. In fact, 
contracts is not only about its very important public function of shifting 
entitlements by consent, but comes, in time, also to protect the private 
expectation that promises are to be kept. As a result, it is in some sense wrong 
and perhaps even immoral not to do so. 
Similarly, criminal and regulatory law do not merely represent public, 
collective assignments of entitlements. Criminal law and regulatory law involve, 
as well, the right of the Victim and the Victim’s family to invoke the state to 
punish those who have wronged them. Here, too, once the collectivity 
determines when and how what is mine can be taken by you, and when it 
 
 6.  See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 918 
(2010). 
 7.  See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the United States: 
Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN. L. REV. 653 (1975); Geoffrey Palmer, The New Zealand 
Experience, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 604 (1993). 
 8.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). 
 9. See, e.g., Karl L. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
437 (1930) (“It is a heresy when Coke or Holmes speaks of a man having liberty under the law to 
perform his contract, or pay damages at his option.”). 
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cannot, all sorts of private expectations come to surround that decision. It 
follows that criminal and regulatory law do not merely represent the most 
efficient way of enforcing that collective decision, but must also do what is 
needed to “compensate” the feelings of those who have been privately wronged 
by the rule breaker. This is why Becker’s celebrated article on criminal 
penalties represents an incomplete picture and inadequately describes the 
penalties criminal law imposes.10 Indeed, it is why the death penalty perdures in 
the United States despite its often-demonstrated inadequate bases either in 
deterrence,11 or in the justice of its application.12 It remains because it is believed 
that the Victim’s relicts have a right to be made whole, to closure, and that—
rightly or wrongly—capital punishment will achieve that closure.13 
Thus, in both contract and criminal or regulatory law, the structure chosen is 
one designed to control the shifting and the nonshifting of entitlements in a way 
that the polity deems desirable. But around that public—in part economically 
based—decision, private rights accrue, and something would be lost if the public 
result were achieved without giving weight to, and recognizing the importance 
of, the private rights that have adhered to the public decision. 
III 
And so it is in torts. Except that here, the privatists, the “Colebergzurkys,” 
as I sometimes call them, claim that the private side is the only significant one 
present, the only one that defines the field. I, and others, have noted that 
without some kind of public—system building—side of torts, one cannot 
determine when a private “wrong” that needs compensation has occurred.14 I 
 
 10.  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968). 
 11.  See John J. Donohue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on 
Murder, 11 AM. L. ECON. REV. 249 (2009). This analysis of the death penalty’s weakness as a deterrent 
goes back to the eighteenth century and Cesare Becarria. See CESARE BECCARIA, The Death Penalty, 
in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 66 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies 
trans., 1995) (1764). 
 12.  See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND 
MISTAKE (1974). If it served as a powerful deterrent, the execution of innocents might not trouble a 
utilitarian. But anyone concerned with justice must consider that horrendous. Furthermore, as Black 
argued, error in capital cases comes not only from the execution of innocents, but from the disparate 
application of the penalty. Id. at 84–96. 
 13.  In most American capital cases, the relatives of the victim demand vengeance as a condition of 
being “made whole.” If revenge killings are indeed capable of making victims’ families whole, then a 
utilitarian might approve of the death penalty, and might even tolerate some error in the penalty’s 
application. For complex reasons that I cannot go into in this short article, I do not believe that this 
utilitarian argument ultimately works. But it is one that has not been analyzed as thoroughly as the 
deterrence argument. In any event, the idea that I must obtain everything that is my right is part and 
parcel of a deep-seated American way of looking at things. See Guido Calabresi, Civil Recourse 
Theory’s Reductionism, 88 IND. L.J. 449, 465–66 (2013) [hereinafter Calabresi, Civil Recourse Theory]. I 
have noted that this dynamic plays out in calls for vengeance in other areas of the law, as well. See 
Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts—The Case of Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 
333 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts]. 
 14.  See Calabresi, Civil Recourse Theory, supra note 13; Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and 
Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND. L.J. 469 (2013). 
1_CALABRESI_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2014  1:33 PM 
4 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:1 
have also suggested that although there may be some system builders (law-and-
economics types) who, like Holmes in his heresy, write as though nothing would 
be lost if the private rights were done away with, neither I—nor certainly Blum 
and Kalven—have taken such a position. What I have said is simply that there is 
an important significance in the torts approach to entitlement shifting that has 
always been there and would continue to define this field of law (and other 
cognate fields) even if the private relationship between Victim and Injurer were 
abolished. 
In this fundamental sense, torts would survive—just as contract and criminal 
law would survive—even if a polity were to decide that the private values that 
have adhered to the field were not worth respecting. This elimination of private 
rights might come about in each of these fields if the polity concluded that the 
private expectations—become rights—cost too much. (That is, the polity might 
decide that recognizing such private rights made accomplishment of the public 
purpose too awkward or expensive.) It could also occur if the polity found 
other, more desirable, means of giving weight to the values that the private 
rights sought to preserve.15 
What, then, is this “public meaning” of torts, which survives even if Victim 
and Injurer are disaggregated? What is the torts equivalent of the shifting of 
entitlements by mutual consent (contracts), or by collective fiat (criminal and 
regulatory law)? It is, as I have written before, the liability rule. It is the societal 
decision to let entitlements be shifted, not solely by private agreement, nor 
solely by collective fiat, but by private decisions in which the price of the shift is 
collectively set.16 And in this respect torts is only one of various cognate fields, of 
which eminent domain is the most obvious.17 
 
 
 15.  For instance, the polity might offer public financing to victims or otherwise honor them. See, 
e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2006) (September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001). Similarly, the 
state might give special honors to those who keep their promises, even when keeping promises is costly. 
 16.  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter Calabresi & 
Melamed, One View of the Cathedral]. It is important to note that the framework that Melamed and I 
developed in that article applies to the situations in which entitlements are shifted, not to the things that 
are shifted. My entitlement to my watch can be shifted through contract in certain situations; in others, 
it might be inalienable; and, in an accident, my entitlement is subject to shifting through tort. The 
framework is situational, contextual, or, if you like, transaction focused. 
 17.  As this article means to show, the use of the word “price” as the assessment that is made 
collectively is misleading. It inevitably makes one think of a market. If one believes the collective 
decision to be an attempt to approach criminal law or regulation, the words that would most likely be 
used to describe the assessment are “penalty” or “sanction.” See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). If, finally, the charge made was neither intended to approach what a 
market would do nor what criminal law or regulation would impose, but a collective determination of 
how readily an entitlement should shift, then a word like “assessment” would seem appropriate. 
Because the literature about liability rules has used the word price almost exclusively, I will, in this 
article, continue to use that word, but I wish to emphasize how problematic that use really is. I am 
grateful to Greg Keating for this and many other useful suggestions. 
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IV 
I have elsewhere written that the liability rule—this torts approach to 
entitlements—has been used in all societies, whether libertarian or collectivist. 
This has been so for practical reasons, including reasons deriving from the 
“overcrowding” of each society’s preferred approach and the comparative 
advantage that the liability-rule way has as to some allocations, given that 
overcrowding.18 I have also noted that in many modern societies—including 
ours—it is used when it need not be,19 for example in medical, workers-
compensation, and products-liability contexts. And I have asserted that its 
broad use speaks to the ideology of the society that relies on the liability rule in 
such contexts. I have said that its broad use defines such a society as social 
democratic, just as the broad use of contracts defines a society as libertarian, 
and of criminal or regulatory law as collectivist. All these are the public-law 
functions of these (to some extent also private) fields of law. 
Today, however, I want to emphasize something else about the liability-rule 
approach. I want to focus on how this social-democratic way of organizing law 
and entitlements fixes the size of the liability. I want to ask, How is the 
collectively set price, on the basis of which entitlements can be shifted, 
determined? In other words, I wish to analyze what the collectivity means to do 
when it decides the size of the tab to be assessed when entitlements are shifted. 
V 
It is both interesting and speaks wonders about the early system builders—
and their economic training and unspoken promarket bias—that many liability-
rule analyses (perhaps my own included) viewed the collective price to be 
entered into the liability rule as being one designed to mirror, or mimic, the 
market price that would have been present had a free market been possible.20 
The liability rule was used—or so it seemed—to remedy market failure. Where, 
because large-number problems, high costs of entering into transactions, and so 
on, were present—where, in other words, a libertarian market was either not 
possible or too expensive to justify its use—then the liability rule was to be 
employed to bring about the result that the free market would have achieved 
had it been available. In this view, the liability rule was there to accomplish as 
 
 18.  See Guido Calabresi, Torts—The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 526–29 
(1978). 
 19.  Id. at 529–34. 
 20.  See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 980 
(1996) (“[A]ccording to Calabresi and Melamed, the law provides a liability rule that allows the 
nonholder to transfer without the holder’s consent and to pay a market price for the transfer of the 
entitlement.”); Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis 
of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1143–44 (2005) (stating that liability rules require 
entitlement takers to pay “a sum that approximates the price that would have been paid under a 
property rule,” and noting that “approximating the market price is not always easy”); Margaret Jane 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1864 (1987) (describing the framework 
Melamed and I developed as defining liability rules as “a scheme of allowable coerced transfers at 
market prices set by official entities”). 
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nearly as possible what the parties would have done had they been able to 
contract, to shift entitlements entirely consensually. 
Today I will argue that such a view of the liability rule, of the public function 
of torts and its cognates, reflects an impoverished picture of law and of 
economics. And, more important, that it is a totally inaccurate description of 
what occurs in the world. Yes, there are times when the collective price inherent 
in the liability rule is designed to mirror a market price, had one been feasible. 
But there are also times when the liability-rule price is designed to approach 
what a collective allocation of entitlements, through regulatory or criminal law, 
would have ordained. And, most interestingly, there are times when the 
collectively set price is there to reflect the polity’s views of the desirability of 
certain entitlement shifts. And that these views may be neither predominantly 
libertarian nor fully collectivist in ultimate object. 
VI 
Before I return to real-life examples of such a diverse use and definition of 
liability rules, let me spend a moment on why such a use can be justified as a 
theoretical matter. First, there is nothing in economic theory that requires the 
view that entitlements should be shifted only if such a shift is consensually 
desired by the parties to a transaction. On appropriate empirical and knowledge 
assumptions every bit as good, or better, results can—from a strictly efficiency 
point of view—be achieved by direct collective allocation and regulation of 
entitlements. With perfect knowledge and no transaction costs, market and 
collective determinations can be equally good. They are completely 
symmetrical.21 Once one introduces knowledge and other transaction costs, 
determining which works best becomes an empirical matter. At that point, it is 
also an empirical matter whether the pure market, or the purely collective 
approach, works better than a liability rule with a collectively set price designed 
to achieve—more effectively—what the collective or the market approach 
would have accomplished. 
Moreover, when the empirical difficulty in either pure market or pure 
command derives from the existence of significant third party–utility effects, 
then a liability rule whose aim is to reflect those effects may well be better than 
either a collective rule or a market rule, or even than a liability rule designed to 
approximate what the market or the command result would be. The empirically 
dominant approach might be a liability rule with a “price” set to achieve 
directly that level of entitlement shifting that, given the existence of third party–
 
 21.  Compare R.H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND 
THE LAW 157, 159 (1988) (“[W]hen there are zero transaction costs, negotiations will lead to an 
agreement which maximizes wealth.”), with LEON TROTSKY, SOVIET ECONOMY IN DANGER: THE 
EXPULSION OF ZINOVIEV 29–30 (1933) (“If there existed the universal mind, that projected itself into 
the scientific fancy of Laplace; a mind that would register simultaneously all the processes of nature and 
of society, that could measure the dynamics of their motion, that could forecast the results of their 
inter-reactions, such a mind, of course, could a priori draw up a faultless and an exhaustive economic 
plan, beginning with the number of hectares of wheat and down to the last button for a vest.”). 
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utility effects, the particular polity desires. 
Let me be more specific. If many people object to the sale of body parts—
even if consensual—because they do not like the fact that such sales—given the 
existing distribution of wealth—result in transfers between poor and rich that 
they find objectionable, a pure market may not be permitted. But collective 
allocations of body-part entitlements may be equally offensive. (People may 
object to such direct determinations of who shall live or die, without adequate 
regard for individual desires.)22 In such a situation, a—very complex—liability-
rule approach, with a price that mimics neither the market nor collective 
regulation, may be optimal. 
This is but one example, and this short article is not the place to go into 
depth in discussing what are appropriate theoretical treatments of such, 
properly termed, merit goods. That is the topic of a much larger work on which 
I am currently engaged.23 My point today is merely to assert that what I shall 
shortly claim is the real-life use of liability rules—sometimes to approach free-
market results, sometimes to approach the desire of collective fiats, and 
sometimes to achieve results that have their own logic—is not a bizarre 
happenstance, but can, in a more complete analysis than I can give here, be 
shown to have theoretical efficiency validity as well. 
VII 
Let us then turn to the actual use of liability rules in torts and in its cognates 
and see instances when the collectively set price seems to be defined to mirror 
the market, when it appears to further collective allocation decisions, and when, 
instead, it can best be explained by a desire to achieve more nuanced social-
democratic goals. 
Let us start with torts—I shall discuss the more dramatic eminent-domain 
examples in a bit. What is going on when a legal system allows punitive 
damages, or gives juries a free rein to set compensatory damages at levels that 
are far greater than those that would make the Victim whole? At times, such 
punitive damages do act as market mimickers. I think this is implicit in 
Catherine M. Sharkey’s, and A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell’s, 
favorable discussions of the multiplier effect (as well as opinions by Judge 
Posner and by me) that suggest the multiplier’s efficiency.24 They do the same 
 
 22.  See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 154–57 (1978). 
 23.  See Guido Calabresi, Inaugural Lecture of the Academic Year of the International University 
College of Turin: Merit Goods, the Commons, and Their Significance for Justice, Efficiency, and 
Equality (May 19, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQnLakWMycM); cf. RICHARD 
A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13–15 (1959) (offering an early discussion of merit 
goods); James Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality, 13 J.L. & ECON. 263, 267 (1970) 
(discussing what he terms “specific egalitarianism”). 
 24.  See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 887–96 (1998); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 
YALE L.J. 347, 363–72 (2003); cf. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Such a [multiplier] conception of damages . . . is not new.”); Kemezy v. 
Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (offering a deterrence rationale for punitive damages); 
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when punitive damages are given to reflect an extra value that a particular 
person places on a good, because that person would not consensually agree to 
give up that good in a free market at the good’s ordinary market price. That is 
why I find W. Kip Viscusi’s discussion of airplane luggage to be inadequate.25 
But there are other times when punitive damages, and run away–jury 
“compensatory” ones, cannot be so explained. In such cases another 
explanation can be readily seen. The collectivity does not want the entitlement 
shifted in such contexts. It may be reluctant, for any number of reasons, to 
make the taking of the entitlement a penal matter. But it may still want to deter 
its occurrence, and not let the entitlement shift happen merely because the 
would-be taker is willing to pay a “market price”—even with an appropriate 
multiplier. By assessing very high extra damages, by making these part of the 
liability rule, the collectivity seeks to make that entitlement approach 
inalienability,26 without formally forbidding its shift. 
Conversely, there are areas of torts in which the damages assessed are self-
consciously less than their market value. The denial of so-called fanciful 
damages, and the strict limitations on the granting of purely emotional damages 
and solely economic ones are obvious examples.27 Again, such rules can at times 
find market-mimicking cost-reduction explanations. The sufferer of fanciful 
damages may be the least-cost avoider.28 Purely emotional damages may, if 
compensated, increase in size (people may feel emotional harm more if they are 
given the right to recover for it).29 And solely economic damages may be best 
handled directly through contracts. Yet these explanations—though in my view 
worthy—have never seemed completely satisfactory. 
I would suggest that another set of reasons may, at times, be at work. These 
may be areas in which the collectivity wishes—for whatever reasons of its 
own—to make easier the shifting of entitlements—and the engaging in activities 
 
Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts, supra note 13, at 338–40. 
 25.  In his article arguing that juries err in myriad ways, Viscusi assumes that punitive damage 
awards are irrational when the dollar-denominated value of damaged luggage is less than the cost of the 
repair that would have prevented the luggage damage. See W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the 
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 111–15 (2001). I do not dispute that luggage 
may well not be worth the protection that Viscusi’s survey participants sought to give it, but to assume 
this based on dollar values is to overlook the private value that people often place on their possessions. 
Indeed, I may love my luggage more than I love Ronald Coase—unlikely, but possible. In such cases, 
punitive damages can help approximate a property rule protecting the beloved luggage. 
 26.  It is for that reason that what One View of the Cathedral termed “inalienable” actually is a set 
of collectively determined rules that at times allow a person to give, but not to sell; to sell, but not to 
destroy; or even perhaps to destroy, but not to sell or give. Calabresi & Melamed, One View of the 
Cathedral, supra note 16, at 1092–93, 1111–15; see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory 
of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985). 
 27.  See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 302 (2000) (discussing emotional harm); Anita 
Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 773 (2006). 
 28.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW 
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 72–76 (1985).  
 29.  Id. at 77–78. 
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that result in entitlement shifts—than would occur in a purely consensual 
market.30 Just as large, extracompensatory damages may reflect a collective 
decision to approach inalienability, so systematically undercompensating 
damages may be the result of a collective decision to encourage those acts or 
activities that result in entitlement changes! And, incidentally, the failure to 
give multiplier damages (or, for that matter, to permit class actions as a way of 
recognizing multiplier effects),31 may represent a decision of exactly the same 
sort. 
The moment one realizes that the liability rule is used not merely to do what 
a market is unable to do, but is, instead, an independent instrument of collective 
decision making, then its seemingly peculiar application in these areas becomes 
readily explainable. Whether the size of damages is designed to approach 
inalienability, or to make shifts in entitlements relatively easier or harder than 
would occur consensually, the explanation for the price chosen lies in a 
collective decision with respect to what and when entitlement shifts are 
relatively desirable and when they are not. 
Let me be clear, though. I am not saying that such decisions are necessarily 
wise or good. That is a different matter; they may or may not be. What I am 
saying is that when one looks at the world of torts, and torts damages, as it 
actually is, one sees significant instances—and occasionally dramatic ones—of 
the use of liability rules to mimic the market, to approach criminal or regulatory 
law results, and also to bring about shifts in entitlements, and in levels of 
activities that cause entitlements changes that are different from those that 
would occur in either a full market or in a full command structure. Once one 
realizes that this is what is happening, one is much better placed to analyze and 
discuss whether the collectively set price and the goals that the collectivity had 
in mind in setting that price are good, bad, or indifferent. One is, in other 
words, able to examine and criticize social-democratic objects on their own 




 30.  Morton Horwitz famously argued that nineteenth-century tort law amounted to a subsidy in 
support of industrialization. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780–1860, at 63–108 (1977); cf. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A 
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981) (arguing that the nineteenth century was not entirely a 
“fault” century, but rather was in significant aspect a nonfault century where rules like the fellow-
servant rule were employed to favor defendants). Some also argue that developing countries often have 
liability rules that are “low priced” in comparison to developed countries in order to spur 
industrialization and economic competitiveness. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci 
Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 
1137–42 (2007) (discussing Judge Posner’s economic account of the choice-of-law rule lex loci delicti 
commissi). 
 31.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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VIII 
If this can be seen in torts, it is even more obvious and dramatic in eminent-
domain and takings law—that other great employer of the liability rule. There 
are, of course, situations in which a taking is not permitted and a change in 
entitlements can only occur consensually. There are others in which a taking is 
banned and a consensual exchange is also forbidden. But takings law concerns 
itself primarily with contexts in which a taking is allowed and a collectively set 
price is assessed on the taker. That is, much takings law is liability-rule law. But 
what is the price to be assessed? 
We commonly assume that the price must be that which would obtain in an 
unforced sale, in other words, the free-market price. That is, we commonly 
assume that takings law is designed to mimic the market. But that is not, in fact, 
always the case or always what is desired. In Italy (and I believe at one time in 
many other countries as well), when property was taken for a public purpose, 
the compensation paid was not the market value of the property, but its value in 
use.32 If the owner of a large estate preferred to keep the property in a luxury or 
farming use, even though selling it for development would yield a far higher 
price, the owner was free to do so. But if the state decided to expropriate the 
property for a public purpose, then the owner was stuck with the use he or she 
had opted for and would receive no more than the value of the property in that 
use. 
I have some personal experience with this; at least in family legend. It is said 
that my great uncle’s lands outside Bologna had significant value. He, however, 
chose not to develop the lands or sell them for development. Whether he did so 
because—as an economist—he had figured that the lands’ development value 
would increase faster than the interest rate he would receive on an earlier sale’s 
gains, or because he enjoyed being a landowner, does not matter. He kept the 
land in farming use. When the polity decided to build an airport near Bologna 
and saw that the large, undeveloped lands belonging to my uncle were well 
situated for an airport, they took his lands by eminent domain. They paid him 
only the lands’ rather meager farming value, making him, and I suppose me, 
much less well off than had they been required to pay the market value of the 
property. 
Why might such a nonmarket compensation price be set? My uncle, good 
economist that he was, always described this as one of the many instances in 
which the law failed to understand economics. And in his case that may even 
have been true. But it is also conceivable that a polity might have wished to 
encourage entitlement shifts from passive landowners to more aggressive uses—
including public purposes. By setting the liability rule price at the value-in-use 
level, the polity tells landowners that they retain their “lordly” use at a peril (if 
the polity desires the property for a public purpose). And this furthers a private, 
 
 32.  See Giuseppe Franco Ferrari, Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, in INTRODUCTION TO 
ITALIAN PUBLIC LAW 255, 271–72 (Giuseppe Franco Ferrari ed., 2008) (discussing the divergence 
between market value and compensation paid in Italian cases of expropriation). 
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consensual, market-value, change in entitlements, as well as the public-purpose 
one, should that latter become desired. Again, it is not for me today to discuss 
the pros and cons of such an approach. But the social-democratic decision to 
value “lordly” uses of entitlements below other ones, is readily apparent. 
Significantly, there are also times when a polity’s collective values seem to 
justify pricing private property at more than its market value for takings 
purposes. Recently, private homes were expropriated in New London, 
Connecticut to further a redevelopment scheme.33 The public purpose was the 
commercial improvement and upgrading of the area (and perhaps even its 
gentrification) for the benefit of the city. But the immediate beneficiaries of the 
right to take the property by eminent domain were private developers. The 
home owners objected angrily to the taking of their properties. Ultimately, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld that taking.34 The result was 
considerable anger and even demonstrations at the home of Justice Souter, who 
had joined the majority Supreme Court opinion.35 
Interestingly, during oral argument, Justice Kennedy asked whether the 
whole thing would not be much more acceptable if—in such circumstances—
while a taking for the public purpose would still be allowed, the price to be paid 
were some multiple, say four times, the market price.36 What he was suggesting, 
it seems to me, was that while nonconsensual entitlement shifts might still be 
properly permitted, in situations like those in Kelo the change in entitlements 
might—for good collective reasons—nonetheless be discouraged through the 
setting of a higher liability-rule price. In other words, the polity could 
appropriately take the opposite view of the ease with which such entitlement 
changes should occur from that taken by Bologna with respect to my uncle’s 
lands. Both Justice Kennedy’s suggestion in Kelo, and the value-in-use 
approach, are examples of a liability rule being employed to further collective 
aims, rather than market-mirroring aims, while still not going to a fully 
command entitlement structure.37 
The same would be true for a polity that assessed larger than compensatory 
tort damages, when environmentally desirable uses were infringed upon.38 
 
 33.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 34.  Id. at 489–90. 
 35.  See David de Sola, Souter’s Home an Activist Target, CNN.COM (Jan. 22, 2006, 11:39 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/01/21/eminent.domain/. 
 36.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108) (“Are there any 
writings . . . that indicate[] that when you have property being taken from one private person ultimately 
to go to another private person, that what we ought to do is to adjust the measure of compensation, so 
that the owner . . . can receive some sort of a premium for the development?”). 
 37.  For an interesting and very recent discussion of this question, see Lee Anne Fennell, Just 
Enough, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 109 (2013) and Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: 
The Idiosynccratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2013). 
 38.  This kind of thing happened even in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 170–75 (1985) (discussing Mill 
Acts that required those who flooded neighboring lands to pay above-market prices to the owners of 
the land they damaged). 
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Conversely, the limiting of damages to further industrialization over passive 
uses seems like more of the same thing. And if this, inevitably, makes torts 
scholars think of the development of negligence as a general requirement for 
liability in the nineteenth century, together with the continued applicability of 
nonfault liability in England when industry infringed on traditional, “natural” 
uses of land (as in Rylands v. Fletcher),39 I would just add that this shows that 
the nuanced, middle view of liability rules that I am describing is nothing new. 
The liability rule, 150 years ago, as now, was not merely the mimicker of the 
market or of full collective aims; it was, and continues to be, the instrument of 
goals that reflect both collectivist and libertarian choice elements! 
IX 
My point in discussing this broader view of the cathedral—in pointing out 
the non–market mimicking, yet not fully collective functions of the liability 
rule—is not just to correct a misapprehension that remains significant, and in 
whose creation I may have unintentionally played a role. Though this, I believe, 
would be more than enough to justify an article, it also serves to underscore the 
importance, indeed the centrality, of the liability rule in the law. The liability 
rule was crucial in the past, but is even more so currently when so many 
societies view themselves as ideologically mixed, as neither fully libertarian nor 
collectivist. In all societies, but especially today, the liability rule is an essential 
part of the social structure and of the law. And that is so in any number of areas 
of law, including, of course, torts. 
This, naturally, brings me back to the beginning of the article and to what 
the “Colebergzurskys” miss. Torts, like contract and criminal or regulatory law, 
has a private function. It responds to people’s desire to receive redress for 
wrongs and, perhaps, to get that redress from the one who wronged them. But 
again, like contract and criminal or regulatory law, it has a fundamental—
indeed a necessary—public function. It represents a central, complex, and 
nuanced way—different from the approaches of contract and criminal or 
regulatory law—to how and when entitlements can be shifted from one party to 
another. If the link between Injurer and Victim were done away with in torts, 
something would be lost. How important that “something” is and whether it 
could be substituted for by other means (say, like uninsurable tort fines),40 is a 
worthy matter of discussion. But what cannot be seriously contended is that 
“torts” would cease to exist, that it would disappear as a field, were Injurers and 
 
 39.  See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) 338–39 (appeal taken from Eng.); 
see also HORWITZ, supra note 30 (discussing the rise of negligence); Rabin, supra note 30 (highlighting 
the complexity of nineteenth century tort doctrine). While the doctrines discussed by Horwitz 
effectuated a subsidy for industry, Rylands, like the Mill Acts, effectuated a tax. 
 40.  I offered a brief discussion in Guido Calabresi, Policy Goals of the “Swedish Alternative,” 34 
AM. J. COMP. L. 657 (1986). I also find it quite fascinating to observe that some European systems 
connect victim and injurer by tying fines to personal wealth. This enables the kind of calibrated 
vengeance that a victim might seek, even when the victim and injurer are, in a system-building sense, 
separated. See, e.g., Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, 12 CRIME & JUST. 49 (1990). 
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Victims disaggregated. The central role that the use of the liability rule plays in 
the shifting of entitlements in the society would still remain. The public—
system building—significance of the field would perdure! 
The privatists would, I suppose, not want what remains to be called torts. 
But that is just fighting over words.41 My teacher, Fleming James, Jr., used to 
say, “You can call it Thucydides, or you can call it Mustard Plaster, but it’s all 
proximate cause just the same!”42 Whether one calls what would survive and be 
central to a legal system. Thucydides, mustard plaster, or by its ancient name of 
torts, it would still be the same! It would still be an ideologically mixed, 
complex, and highly nuanced way of affecting when, how, to what degree, and 
how differently in different contexts, entitlements can be taken by one from 
another. It would still be the liability-rule approach properly understood in a 
broader view of the cathedral of law. 
 
 
 41.  Of course, fighting over words is something that we do all the time. The privatists well know, 
as do I, that to call something “torts” is to carry hundreds of years of law into the discussion. One sees 
this in any number of scholarly debates: for example, the fight over what is “property.” If something is 
called “property,” immediately all sorts of protections become the baseline from which the debate 
launches. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Guido 
Calabresi, Conclusioni, in FRA INDIVIDUO E COLLETTIVITÀ: LA PROPRIETÀ NEL SECOLO XXI 239, 
239 (2013) (It.) (discussing the historical fight over the word “property”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Property, Power, and Freedom, in FRA INDIVIDUO E COLLETTIVITÀ: LA PROPRIETÀ NEL SECOLO 
XXI, supra, at 79 (discussing theories of property rights, and critiquing Reich’s arguments). Another 
deep inquiry into fighting over words is Jan Deutsch’s exploration of the meaning of “law,” as opposed 
to “politics.” See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 169–74 (1968). Words carry tremendous 
emotional and logical luggage. 
 42.  See Guido Calabresi, You Can Call it Thucydides or You Can Call it Mustard Plaster, but it’s 
All Proximate Cause Just the Same!, 91 YALE L.J. 1 (1981). 
